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Abstract This paper argues that there is a relationship
between the structure of live theater and the question of
whether human beings have free will, and that the practice
of live theater and the pursuit of philosophical certitude
regarding free will are both constructive human experi-
ences coalesced around roughly the same set of sensations.
Keywords Freedom  Constraint  Painting 
Thought experiment
My earliest experience having to do with the pleasure of
seeing live theater came to me second-hand. When I was
seven, my father and stepmother had gone to a revival of
‘‘Camelot’’ at the Kennedy Center and my father had come
home positively glowing.
Glowing about what? It wasn’t the beautiful tunes or
extravagant sets that had launched him into his wise-yet-
boyish ‘‘Gosh, ya really gotta hand it to ‘em’’ fervor. It was
the fact that Richard Harris, the grizzled, grinning star of
the show, had forgotten his lines; and, once the train had
jumped the tracks, Mr. Harris drove it into the woods. He
sat down on the edge of the stage with the actor playing
Lancelot and improvised a dialogue about the struggles of
keeping a kingdom running: a dialogue which was also a
thinly-veiled code for the difficulties of remembering one’s
lines after having reached a certain age and after having
drunk a certain amount, over the decades, of alcohol.
This interlude lasted several minutes: and during those
precious minutes, my father, as he put it, ‘‘enjoyed the
living shit’’ out of ‘‘Camelot.’’ What he actually enjoyed
was being present in the same room, in real time, in a
genuine real-life predicament, with the movie star Richard
Harris. Over and over again, the actor playing Lancelot
attempted, with comically public effort, to remind Harris of
the missing line: but Harris didn’t want help. He didn’t
want to go back to the play. He was enjoying taking a break
from the unremitting constraint of performing that beloved
war horse. Once Harris finally wrung all the humor he
could out of his performative faux-pas, he rose to his feet
and, with his trademark Irish gameness, leapt back into the
story. When he did so, repeating with self-conscious
derring-do the last line he’d uttered before the comically
cathartic catastrophe, the audience leapt to its feet and
applauded and cheered for a long time.
For what were they cheering? What had happened? Why
was my father so happy?
The play had broken open. The real people behind the
fiction had been revealed: more importantly, they’d freely
elected to reveal themselves. And those real people, led by
Richard Harris, then led the audience, after a long soak in
the silly ocean of relatively absolute freedom, back into the
comforting constraints of an essentially tragic tale.
Usually when one attends a performance of ‘‘Camelot,’’
it isn’t until the sweetly melancholic passing-away-of-
glory the musical demonstrates has ended that the audience
gets the eschatological pleasure, during the curtain call, of
being reminded that there is a world where it doesn’t
necessarily have to end that way: it’s the real world they’re
about to walk out into. But my father and his fellow the-
ater-goers got that jolt of hopeful acknowledgment in the
middle of the play, and then watched the now more-obvi-
ously fictional disassembly of Paradise ensue. For the
second half of the performance, from the moment Richard
Harris restarted, with modest yet swashbuckling charm, the
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play, and on through the end, the audience enjoyed what
we might call ‘‘the best of both worlds.’’
They watched it all ‘‘go wrong’’ in Camelot, but they
watched it ‘‘go wrong’’ knowing all the time, far more
deeply than the average audience, that nothing could really
‘‘go wrong’’—because, obviously, everything in Camelot
was unreal. The actors playing Arthur and Lancelot, no
matter how much they might fight onstage, were obviously
good friends. The friendship they shared, demonstrated by
Lancelot’s willingness to join Harris in the unmasking and
then by his offers of comradely assistance, assured the
audience that they would never be led by this smiling crew
into a sorrow from which they couldn’t recover. Of course,
the sense of cosmic decay that ‘‘Camelot’’ enacts in min-
iature still had its accuracy and truth: but how much more
accurate and true seemed those sensations they had enjoyed
while the play was completely blown open. Cosmic decay
be damned, Mr. Harris’ slip-up, smile, and sly abdication
seemed to say: it’s just a bloody play.
Thought experiment: which would you rather see? (A) a
production of ‘‘Camelot’’ in which the stars playing the
leads flawlessly perform the play; (B) a production of
‘‘Camelot’’ in which the stars break character by accident,
playfully improvise for a while, and then resume the play;
or (C) an entirely different play, flawlessly performed,
about actors breaking character in a production of ‘‘Cam-
elot,’’ during which the actors pretend to forget their lines
and pretend to improvise, but it’s all in the script, word for
word.
Extra credit: What kind of world do you think you’re
living in?
Every art form has its own unique interplay of freedom
and constraint: and within each form, different artists find
their own way of striking a fresh and personal balance of
the two competing impulses. In painting, for example, the
photorealism of Richard Estes offers a highly constrained
vision of the world. Estes’ painstakingly realistic depic-
tions of cityscapes are vehement and vivid testimonies to
the power of precision, of working within viciously
delineated limits. Of course, we never know how reli-
giously Estes has actually conformed, in a given painting,
to the facts of what was in the photograph from which he
worked: but the internal visual syntax of the paintings
decree almost audibly that nothing will be allowed to look
less than real and everything will be required to appear real
to roughly the same degree. The style sets the rules and the
rules are exacting.
Another kind of exactitude shines forth, in an entirely
different manner, from the Abstract Expressionist paintings
of Barnett Newman. By confining himself, in much of his
work, to a severely limited visual lexicon—solid fields of
color bisected by his trademark ‘‘zip’’—Newman presents
a highly constrained vision. The viewer looks for freedom
within the work and finds it in only four places: what colors
did Newman use? Where did he put the ‘‘zip’’? What is the
shape and size of the canvas? And: the freedom that can be
located by the question: why did he choose to paint this
painting at all?
Those freedoms are all relatively massive, given the way
Newman organizes reality for himself and the viewer. But
there are ways of painting that are even more replete with a
sense of freedom than the methods of Estes or Newman
generate.
In the action paintings of Jackson Pollock, to choose a
rather obvious example, one is presented with a vision of
freedom driven almost to the point of chaos. In the vastly
multi-various body of work created by Pablo Picasso, one
gets the sense they are watching a mind supremely free, at
play with itself and the universe. In the whimsical moves
made by Pop artists like Andy Warhol and Claes Olden-
burg, a freedom of content, of thought regarding what is the
proper subject matter for art, is inherent in the work.
(Just to be clear: I’m aware that it’s possible to see all
these binary oppositions in exactly the opposite way. Estes
might say, in an interview, that in his slavish commitment
to painting realistically, he finds himself set free, so to
speak, to actually paint. It is also possible to see the action
paintings of Pollock not as records of human freedom, but
as records of one man’s absolute submission to the con-
straints of chance. Fine. My point is simply that within
painting, as in any art form, the consumer receives a
transmission that contains degrees of freedom and con-
straint in various ratios, and, I would say, the ratio of
freedom to constraint within a given work of art is either a
partial record of the artist’s experience of the world or a
pure creation made in response to a world which has been
experienced as being to some degree free and to some
degree constrained.)
Live theater, in which human beings, speaking words
from pre-written scripts, moving in patterns dictated by
others, go through the motions, as it were, of making free
choices, initiating causes and experiencing effects, presents
the audience with, to me, the most interesting mixture of
freedom and constraint available. Most people, when they
say they love live theater, say they enjoy knowing that ‘‘it’s
different every night.’’ And it is different every night, but
within limits: in some cases, within severely exacting
limits.
Now, there are many kinds of theater. A company called
Too Much Light Makes The Baby Go Blind performs a
brand of theater they call ‘‘non-illusory,’’ in which the
actors play themselves and no effort is made to create
verisimilitude. (The question of whether the word ‘‘them-
selves’’ should be in quotations in the previous sentence I’ll
leave to stronger minds than mine.) The plays are true right
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then and there and are not intended to duplicate an imag-
ined reality. In companies like Second City or The
Groundlings, comic actors perform fictional scenes with a
large degree of improvisation. People make all kinds of
theater. For the purposes of this essay, however, when I say
‘‘live theater’’ I am referring to performances of scripted
works in which the general tendency is to adhere to the
script and present the audience with roughly the same show
every night.
What is the worldview of such theater? If an Estes
painting is, for the sake of argument, an image of con-
straint, and a Pollock is an image of freedom, what is the
live theater of Chekhov? What is the live theater of Ma-
met? And what vision of human freedom, in general, is live
theater transmitting as a form? Is it a celebration of human
freedom or a mourning of cosmic constraint? The obvious
answer is it’s both: but to what degree freedom is cele-
brated in live theater and to what degree constraint is
mourned and, conversely, to what degree freedom is
mourned and constraint celebrated, and what those ratios
say about the human experience, are different and, to me,
interesting questions.
I’m a playwright, and I’ve written a number of plays that
can be seen as messages about cosmic constraint and the
limits of human freedom. In ‘‘Recent Tragic Events,’’ for
example, an audience member flips a coin—with the help
of the stage manager—before the play, and the audience is
told that the result of the coin flip will determine a number
of plot movements within Act One: each time something
occurs which was determined by the flip of the coin, the
audience is told, a bell-like tone will sound: and, indeed, all
through Act One the action is punctuated by the sounding
of the bell-like tone. At the top of Act Two, however, the
stage manager addresses the audience once more, reveals
herself as an actress, and informs the audience that
everything happened in Act One according to the published
script and that the coin flip was a scam. There was no
chance and no freedom. She then invites the audience to
watch Act Two keeping continually aware of the fact that
there is only one way the action can unfold. Considering
the fact that, within the plot of the play, a life hangs in the
balance, it’s a bracing reminder.
Similarly, my play ‘‘Grace’’ opens with a triple-murder-
suicide, and then goes back in time to show the audience
how the characters came to that sorry end. (Tellingly, the
play opens and closes with the line ‘‘You can’t’’ in
response to the line, ‘‘I want to go back.’’) Several times
during the course of the play, the characters go backwards
in time and then forwards again for a few pages, each time
duplicating the actions of the previous moments without
variation. The message is delivered over and over again
that no matter how much we feel we could go back and do
things differently, we can’t. But near the end of the play,
one of the characters undergoes a change of heart that feels
like the kind of thing that turns people away from bad
choices, and for a few minutes the audience thinks: ‘‘Oh.
It’s not going to end that terrible way, is it? Thank God.’’
But then it all happens the way it happened at the begin-
ning, leaving the audience (I hope) to respond to the
implicit question: ‘‘What is this weird capacity you have
for thinking things can turn out any other way than the way
you were shown, word for word, they would turn out?’’
Obviously, plays like these transmit explicit messages
about human freedom and cosmic constraint, and they use
the determinism inherent in the practice of live theater to
do so. The message tends to be something like: ‘‘Human
beings are free, but not very; and their freedom mostly
consists in being able to choose how to think and feel about
what will happen no matter what; acknowledging these
limitations together, as an audience, provides consolation.’’
Other playwrights, obviously, have less or no explicit
interest in these issues, and they write plays about princes
dealing with complex legacies, sisters living in the Russian
countryside, lovers in roadside motels, or salesmen con-
spiring in close quarters. But their plays quite often lead to
moments where the protagonists either say out loud, or
imply with their actions, some version of: ‘‘This play
cannot go any other way than the way it’s going!’’ And this
announcement is usually followed by a clarifying of con-
fusions followed by an attendant relaxation of tension, and
the viewer gets the pleasant sense they are headed for the
curtain. In plays with a lot of dramatic action, this moment
happens near the end of Act One; in more contemplative
plays, it happens late in the final act. The net effect is
essentially the same, though: the audience is made to
understand that the play (and, implicitly, life itself) is a
largely deterministic system, and that they have gathered in
the theater to mourn and celebrate, to varying degrees, that
fact; for, of course, both anxiety and absolution are acti-
vated by such a proclamation. When confronted, in a work
of art, by the mostly deterministic systems in which we
move, we feel more sharply the cosmic constraint, which
results, to some degree, in a feeling of anxiety—‘‘No
matter how hard I try, I will never be an artist!’’—but we
also, within the frame of that constraint, find a pathway to
freedom in the conceptual leap to: ‘‘I don’t have to try to be
an artist anymore! It’s not possible!’’ Being in the same
room with other human beings who, through an act of self-
conscious pretending, release in their bodies the energies of
these cosmic confessions of finitude, can be transformative.
Any actor who has played Oedipus, Lear, Masha or Teach
knows this: to stand on a stage before a voluntary audience
and enact a moment of infinite humility before the massive
determinism of a dramatic situation that, because it is
scripted, cannot be altered or out-maneuvered, is to per-
form a priestly role in a secular setting. To bear the pain
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and glory of that ultimate predicament in effigy, as it were,
is electrifying work.
But mustn’t we acknowledge then, having seen this
effect take place over and over again, for centuries, admit
to ourselves that the resonances occasioned by these
moments attest with almost scientific accuracy to the nature
of life itself?
Of course, the question of whether human beings possess
free will has been debated for centuries, with no conclusive
answer in sight. As far as I’m concerned, the question
always inaugurates what I would call a ‘‘fake conversa-
tion.’’ If the goal of the conversation is to find out what
another person believes or if the goal is to state what you
yourself believe, then I suppose it has relational value, but
when no conclusive answer can ever be arrived at, to carry
on a conversation with the tone and vehemence of a genuine
search for certainty always feels to me like bad magic.
Why can no resolution to the question ever be arrived
at? Because in order to prove free will, one would have to
be able to live the same moment of choosing twice, and
choose differently within that duplicated moment. But we
all know the river of time never stops flowing, so there’s no
way of testing any hypotheses about free will. Any con-
versation about free will is doomed to be only and ever just
that: a conversation.
That being said, much can be profitably verbalized about
how free or constrained life feels. The subjective sensation
of having what feels like a free choice set before you; the
experience of the texture of the actual act of choosing,
whether it’s real or not; the sensations of satisfaction or
regret that follow close on the heels of choices that feel
freely made: these are all very real sensations and real
feelings, and for live theater to create resonance and
meaning for the audience, there need be no final certainty
about the reality of free will: there need only be basic
agreement about how free or constrained life feels. And if
live theater and its historical efficacy as an art form are to
be trusted, we have to assume that life feels to most people
mostly quite constraining, and very rarely free.
Playwrights, after all, write about characters in predic-
aments: people hemmed from within or without by cir-
cumstance: and then those characters push through the
predicaments toward partial ruin or partial reward, or,
rarely, they remain perpetually in the predicament, and the
perpetual nature of the predicament becomes the subject
matter. But whatever freedom playwrights afford their
characters, the characters’ freedom arises only in response
to predicaments: is enacted within its own unique predic-
ament (that of the contours of their own character, i.e., ‘‘I
could lie and get out of this, but unfortunately, I can’t
choose to lie’’): and finally ends in either a fresh predica-
ment or in a temporary release from contingency which we
know will soon be invaded by a fresh predicament.
Live theater’s bread and butter is what Heidegger called
‘‘the constraint of Being.’’ The characters in most plays
move with very little freedom through highly constraining
situations, and usually make only one extravagantly free-
looking act per play. Most of the activity in most plays can
be ascribed to character, which means it isn’t free activity
and it doesn’t even look free. Most characters do exactly
what they would do: they can’t help it. It’s only when a
character does something outside what even they expect
would be possible for them to do that the mirage of
objectively-seen freedom begins to appear.
For the most part, live theater sends this message: we’re
free, but not very much, and to activate even that small
degree of freedom takes a lot of courage and luck. Which is
why it’s so pleasant when the actors in a play break
character: it gives the audience a brief relief from the
highly constrained worldview live theater quietly transmits.
It says: there is a reality beyond this highly constrained
construct in which we are all very free.
What to make of the pleasure such a momentary
rupture affords?
What kind of world are we living in?
What kind of world are we living in?
We all have our own answers to that question, and this is
mine: we live in a world where our feelings, tastes,
ambitions, habits and drives were formed in us before we
were old enough to recognize them as something separate
from and pasted onto ‘‘reality.’’ We live in a world where
we spend most of our time dealing with the effects of
causes that preceded us, and preemptively preparing for
effects we know we’re currently causing: this leaves very
little time to freely act, sui generis, in the here and now, if
such freedom is even possible. Most of all, we live in a
world where death is unavoidable; where most of our
instinctive behaviors, masked by cultural specificities, have
to do with forgetting or delaying our awareness of that fact.
Caught between the wall of our own certain death and the
crashing tidal wave of the past, we are between a rock and
a very hard place.
Set into this matrix of pre-determined and continually
reinforced contingency, however, are a few jewel-like
moments where what looks and feels like pure freedom
shine, where the constraints of life fall away, either by
accident or by design, and another way of being is dis-
closed. The essential but perhaps tired example of such a
moment is when one person gives up their life to save
another’s. (Of course, blind egotism often fuels such
decisions; but when it doesn’t, when the decision to sac-
rifice oneself is largely altruistic, we sense an infinite
freedom.) Also, in the virtuosic leaps of imagination we see
enacted in various art forms, we sense the horizonless
freedom of minds at pure play. And in small ways every
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day (often very small) we see people around us choose
against self-interest and, more importantly, against their
own characters, in the service of what seems to be an
intrepid, investigative modality with mysterious purposes
of its own.
(Undoubtedly, some readers will grow either dizzy or
bored as I mix metaphors here, or nonsensically ascribe
purposes to ways of being which have no intentionality: but
I am a firm believer in the idea that language, like light
near the singularity of a black hole, bends into complicated
shapes when it gets close to the truth.)
The essential point is this: as the poet Gerard Manley
Hopkins wrote, ‘‘There lives the dearest freshness deep
down things’’—and whether the spring of that dear fresh-
ness, that puny, potent feeling we call ‘‘freedom’’ is, as
Hopkins believed, divine, or whether it is simply a natural
layer of our animal experience the depth of which results in
it being seen only rarely, when circumstances break open
the more common surfaces upon which we move and by
which we’re supported, matters less than that the feeling
happens. Live theater is one method we have evolved as a
species of examining that feeling: celebrating the fact of its
existence and mourning the rareness with which it occurs.
In live theater, we see our highly constrained predicament
played out, as an act of pure pleasure within the parenthesis
of imaginative effort: it is thus rendered visible, bearable,
and beautiful.
When Richard Harris sat down on the edge of the stage
and riffed, in rough language, on the problems of staying
adequately drunk and adequately in control, he did slightly
more than entertain. He functioned in that moment as a
sign, in the semiotic sense of the word: a sign that indicated
this: Don’t be fooled by how real the constraints of life may
seem to be. There is another way. You just have to stop, sit
down, and BE.
We feel very little free.
Live theater makes that very little freedom feel like
just enough.
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